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11. Introduction
The goal of a ‘just’ distribution of income and wealth is a central issue in the economic policy
debates of modern industrialized countries. An open question, however, is not only what is meant
by a just distribution, but also what is the impact of inequality on the aggregate outcomes of an
economy. Clearly, one of the most important potential effects of inequality is its impact on the
incentives to save and invest. The possible effects of inequality on economic growth due to such
incentives is the topic of the present paper.
Is there a trade-off or a complementarity between equity and efficiency? Economists’ opinion on
this topic is far from uniform. One position holds that a just distribution is a necessary condition
for a prosperous economic development. Adam Smith turns out to be a prominent advocate of this
view. In the ‘Wealth of Nations’ he writes
“No society can surely be flourishing and happy
of which the far greater part of the members is poor and miserable."
For this view a high income level for few individuals or privileged ranks cannot be a source of
development and growth. Societies’ goal should be to raise the standard of living of the whole
population including the lower classes, this in turn being the basis of a prosperous economy.
Mainstream economics of the past decades takes a somewhat different position. The opinion is that
well functioning markets can guarantee efficiency, but the outcome may not necessarily be a just
one. In the words of Arthur Okun:
“The trade-off between equity and efficiency is our biggest socio-economic trade-off,
We can’t have our cake of market efficiency and share it equally.”
Throughout the post-war period until recently this position was accepted by the majority of
economists. According to this position, economic progress will trickle down to the poor if the
wealthy are unimpeded to pursue their goals. The logic of this equity-efficiency trade-off implies
that policy makers have the choice between higher living standards on average but high inequality,
or a smaller pie but a larger slice for the poor. In other words, more justice in the distribution of
income requires to sacrifice output. The price of redistributing income is a lower output, or in a
dynamic setting, slower long-run growth.
2This opinion is not undisputed in the recent literature. While this new literature does not deny that
there is some truth in the above arguments, the efficiency-equality tradeoff as a valid generalization
has been questioned. This challenge of the recent literature is based both on empirical and
theoretical developments.
First, the tradeoff has been questioned as a matter of fact. There is very little empirical evidence
suggesting that initial inequality in the distribution of income and wealth has a positive impact on
subsequent long-run growth rates. To the contrary, studies that regress long-run growth rates on
inequality indicators using cross-country data find a negative correlation between these two
variables. It seems that, if there is a relationship at all, inequality is harmful for growth.
The second reason that casts doubt on the equity-efficiency tradeoff comes from the theoretical
literature. More and more economists are arguing that inequality itself may have negative incentive
effects. High inequality may lead to lower levels of work effort and, what is of crucial importance
in a growth context, to restricted incentives and/or opportunities to undertake productive
investments in education and innovative activities. This is not to say that the conventional analysis
has become theoretically less compelling or even redundant. However, the previously one-sided
focus on the negative side of equality and redistribution has been complemented by a more
comprehensive view of the incentive problems facing modern economies.
The object of the present paper is to give a critical review of the recent literature on the inequality-
growth puzzle. The aim is not to give a comprehensive survey of this literature, but to outline the
most important ideas as well as those approaches which have received too little attention in the
recent debate.1 I will touch both some empirical points as well as the recent discussion of the
inequality-growth puzzle in the theoretical literature.
The paper is organized as follows. I will start with a review of some empirical facts in Section 2.
There I will first display some historical trends in the evolution of the income distribution and then
discuss some more recent trends. I will then briefly review the literature on the empirical
relationship between inequality and long-run growth rates.
In Section 3 I will consider the role of the functional distribution of income in the growth process
from a theoretical point of view. While the functional distribution plays a central role in classical
3and Keynesian theories of economic growth, recent theories devote only little attention to it. In my
opinion, this is not justified both on empirical and theoretical grounds.
In Section 4 I will discuss the role of the personal distribution for the long-run growth experience
of economies. It is predominantly the personal distribution which has attracted much attention in
the recent literature. I will confine the discussion to the main approaches, in particular to the
consequences of imperfect capital markets.
Section 5 presents an approach that has attracted far less attention in the recent literature but is
central to Keynesian theories of investment and growth: the role of demand. In almost all recent
approaches, the demand for produced output plays a passive role in determining the rate of
technical progress. While this may be a convenient simplification for many purposes, it leaves one
crucial aspect out of consideration: the role of expected demand and expected profits for
investment and innovation decisions. In Section 5 I will sketch a model in which the income
distribution plays a central role as a determinant of expected demand.
Section 6 summarizes and draws some conclusions.
2. Empirical Evidence: Trends in Income Distribution and
the Relationship between Inequality and Growth
2.1. Changes in the Evolution of Income Inequality
Let us first take a look at the empirical evidence on long-run distributional trends of various
industrialized countries.2 Until two or three decades ago, the ‘Kuznets-curve’ was accepted as an
empirical stylized fact. The Kuznets-curve (Kuznets, 1955) describes the relationship between
income inequality on the one hand, and the level of economic development, i.e. per-capita income,
on the other. According to the Kuznets-hypothesis, economic progress, as measured by per capita
income, is initially accompanied by rising inequality but as the benefits of development trickle
down to the more backward sectors and regions in the economy these disparities start to decrease.
This implies a hump-shaped relationship between income inequality and per-capita income.
Inequality increases when per-capita income is low and starts to decrease after a certain threshold
has been surpassed.
4Figure 1: The Kuznets-Curve
Figure 1 depicts the downward sloping branch of the Kuznets-curve for various industrialized
countries. As a measure of inequality the vertical axis shows the income of the 20 per cent richest
as a fraction of GDP. The horizontal axis measures the level of the per-capita income (on a
logarithmic scale). The lines in the figure measure the changes in these two variables for various
countries since the end of last century. Consider, for example, the development in the U.K. In 1880
the U.K. had a per-capita income of less than 2,000 $ (in 1970 prices) while roughly 60 % of the
total income was earned by the 20 per cent richest. A century later, incomes have increased to more
than 7,000 $, and the fraction of total income earned by the 20 per cent richest has decreased to less
than 40 per cent. Similar trends can be seen for most of the other countries shown in Figure 1: an
increase in per capita income goes hand in hand with a reduction of income inequality. This trend
is visible until the mid 1970s.
Figure 2: Recent Trends in Income Inequality
Since the late 1970s, however, the picture has changed. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the income
distribution for the G7 industrialized countries since the base year 1977. The horizontal axis
measures time while the vertical axis measures inequality with an index (1977=100) for the relative
deviation of the Gini-index from its 1977-value. It is well known, that there has been a dramatic
increase in inequality in the U.K.. In other countries, such as Germany, the U.S. and Japan there
was a slight increase in inequality since 1977. In contrast, in France, Canada and Italy there was
either no change or there was a reduction in inequality.
Figure 2 shows that the income inequality in these countries is by no means a constant. It also
shows that there is no universal trend towards more inequality as is frequently claimed. There is
significant variation across countries.3
The above data refer to the personal distribution of income. It is no less interesting to look at the
functional distribution. In macroeconomic contexts, income distribution is frequently defined as
the distribution of income between factors of production, that is the shares in national income of
labor and non-labor incomes, or ‘factor shares’. Referring to Kaldor’s stylized facts on the growth
process, it is often implicitly assumed that the functional distribution of income is a very stable
variable which fluctuates around a horizontal trend.
5Figure 3: Changes in the Functional Distribution of Income
Figure 3 displays the time-series data of the labor share of GDP in various countries since the early
1960s. It is evident from the figure that these series show substantial fluctuations.4 The assumption
that the labor share is constant over time appears to be consistent with the data for the U.K.. The
evidence is less clear for the U.S. where the labor share has decreased somewhat in the past
decades. In Germany and France the labor share was rising until the early 1980s but shows a
significant reduction thereafter. In sum, Figure 3 shows that the functional income distribution
displays substantial fluctuations over time. The assumption that the labor share is a constant is hard
to justify.
2.2. Income Inequality and Economic Growth
Let us now turn to the central topic of this paper and consider the evidence on the relationship
between income inequality and economic growth.
Figure 4: Inequality and Growth
Figure 4 plots a measure of the long-run growth rate (over the period 1970-1988) against a measure
of the Gini-coefficient.5 This figure which is taken from a paper by Clarke (1995) shows a clear
result: more inequality is associated with lower long-run growth rates. The results are
representative for numerous other studies and do not depend on the particular time period nor on a
particular inequality indicator used in the empirical analysis.
The above findings are a major development in the new empirical literature on inequality and
growth. This literature started with a paper by Berg and Sachs (1987) which did not analyze the
determinants of long-run growth rates, but the structural causes of the debt crises in the 1980s.
Surprisingly, these authors found that income inequality was one of the most important factors in
explaining the probability of debt rescheduling in a cross-section of middle-income countries.
Countries with very high inequality such as Brazil, the Philippines or Morocco had to reschedule
their debt on an emergency basis, while other countries with a similar level of development but
lower inequality, like Thailand, India or Tunisia could repay their debt. Evidently, the ability to
repay depends closely on the savings formation in the economy. It seems that savings formation
was higher in economies with a relatively more even income distribution.
6The empirical relationship between long-run growth and income inequality was analyzed not until
later. “Is inequality harmful for growth?“ is the title of a paper by Persson und Tabellini (1994).
The answer of the authors as well as of Alesina und Rodrik (1994) is “yes”. Using cross-country
data and historical time-series, these studies show that higher inequality at the beginning of a
longer-term period has a negative impact on the growth rate during the subsequent period. The
authors interpret this as a causal effect of inequality on the long-run growth prospect of an
economy.
Deininger and Squire (1998) from the World Bank replicated these studies with more recent and
internationally comparable data. They find that the impact of initial inequality on subsequent
growth is negative in most cases but not always significant. However, inequality in the distribution
of assets, as proxied by the distribution of land, has a significant and robust negative effect on
subsequent growth.6
3. The Functional Distribution of Income and Economic Growth
The empirical evidence from cross-country regressions suggests that income inequality is by no
means a necessary condition for favorable growth prospects of an economy. If such a relationship
exists at all, then the opposite is true: inequality is harmful for growth.
The above findings are in sharp contrast to the prejudice of most economists which is based on the
assumption that the savings rate of the rich is higher than the savings rate of the poor. This
argument goes back to the classical economists, according to whom the dynamics of accumulation
in an economy is driven by the capital owners. The argument is also central in Keynesian theories
of growth and income distribution, in which the savings rate from profits is higher than the savings
rate from wages (Kaldor, 1956). When economic growth depends on the aggregate savings rate, it
follows that a high profit share is good for growth.
This leads us to the role of the functional income distribution, i.e. the distribution of income
between wages and profits. We have seen above that the labor share is far from stable over time.
From an empirical point of view, it is therefore suggestive to look at the role of factor shares in the
standard macroeconomic models. I will do that in the context of the simplest endogenous growth
model, an AK-model.
7In the AK-model, aggregate output Y(t) is proportional to the aggregate capital stock K(t), the
production function can therefore be written as
(1) )()()( tKLAtY ⋅=
The parameter A reflects the technological structure of production in the economy. A may depend
on the size of the labor force L which is assumed to be constant over time. For the purpose of the
present argument, however, the only important point is that A measures the efficiency with which
the capital stock is used in production.
Clearly, the above production function has increasing returns to scale if labor has a productive role.
This means that a competitive allocation of output is infeasible: factors cannot be rewarded their
marginal product. At this stage we will simply assume that the market structure and the institutions
are such that a share λ accrues to labor, and the complementary share 1-λ accrues to capital. In a
more elaborated model λ would be a function of the market structure as well as market
imperfections that affect the demand for and the prices of production factors.
With these assumptions on the functional distribution, labor and capital income can be expressed as:
(2) )()( tYLtw ⋅λ= and )()1()( tYtrK ⋅λ−=
where w(t) is the wage rate and r is the interest rate. Note that in equation (2) the interest rate is
independent of t. Using equation (1) it is easy to see that this is actually the case:
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Thus the interest rate is constant over time and decreases with the labor share.
Now we can consider the impact of the labor share λ on the economy’s growth rate. I will do that
for the two ‘workhorse’ models of growth theory: the Ramsey-model and the overlapping
generations-model.7
8Consider first the Ramsey-model. In this-model, the household maximizes utility over an infinite
time horizon and for the purpose of the present analysis we assume that lifetime utility takes the
form
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where U is the present value of lifetime utility, c(τ) is the level of consumption in period τ, ρ is the
rate of time preference and σ is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The
functional form in (4) together with a constant interest rate guarantees that the optimal growth rate
of consumption is constant. Moreover, in a balanced growth equilibrium output and consumption
grow at the same rate. The growth factor is given by the familiar relation which expresses the
change in consumption and output as a function of the interest rate r, the rate of time preference ρ
and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption 1/σ.
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The last expression in equation (5) is obtained by replacing the interest rate by the right-hand-side
of equation (3) so that the growth factor can be expressed in terms of the labor share λ. Clearly, an
increase in this share leads to a lower interest rate and reduces the incentive to save. The result is
slower growth.
The result of equation (5) is perfectly compatible with the conventional approach to the impact of
the labor share on the growth rate. If the income flow of the rich is predominantly capital income
and the income flow of the poor predominantly wage income, than the rich have a higher savings
rate than the poor. An increase in the labor share decreases the growth rate, since there is
redistribution from households with a high savings rate to those with a low savings rate. The
consequence is a negative relation between inequality and growth.
Bertola (1993) has shown that the conventional Keynesian approach and the AK/Ramsey-model
show a striking similarity with respect to savings behavior. The steady-state equilibrium in the AK-
Ramsey model is characterized by a situation in which the propensity to consume form wages is
unity while an (endogenous) fraction of capital income is saved. Just like in the Keynesian analysis
9an increase in the labor share redistributes income away from the factor that contributes
disproportionately to aggregate savings.
An immediate implication of this simple model is that taxation of capital income is detrimental to
growth. Taxes on capital reduce the after-tax interest rate and therefore the incentive to save. The
consequence is a lower growth rate.
We reach a very different conclusion when we consider Diamond’s (1965) overlapping generation
model. In this model, individuals live for two periods, in the first period they work, in the second
they retire. Ruling out bequests, the objective function of a typical household is the same as in
equation (4) above. The ‘sole’ difference is that only today’s and tomorrow’s utility enter the
decision problem. In other words, the upper limit of summation in equation (4) is 1 instead of ∞. In
the first period individuals get wage income w(t)L, part of which is consumed and part of which is
saved for retirement. In the second period these savings plus the accrued interest income is
consumed.
How is the growth rate determined in such a set-up? Since there are no bequests, today’s savings of
the young represent tomorrow’s capital stock. That is, we have
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where s is the savings rate. In general, s depends on the interest rate and therefore on the labor share
λ.
We can now ask, how a change in the labor share affects growth in the context of the overlapping
generations model. The answer is not a priori clear. On the one hand, a higher labor share increases
the wage bill in the economy, that is the income of the young. Since only the young save, an
increase in λ leads to higher savings and therefore to a higher future capital stock. This direct effect
of the labor share tends to increase the growth rate.
On the other hand, an increase in the labor share leads to a lower interest rate and, for this reason
has an indirect impact on the savings rate. It is easy to show that the impact of the interest rate on
the savings rate depends on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, that is on the
parameter σ. When σ = 1, that is when the utility function is logarithmic, the savings rate is
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independent of the interest rate; in this case income and substitution effects are of equal magnitude.
If σ > 1, the savings rate decreases if the interest rate increases. If σ < 1, the two variables move in
the same direction.
A variety of empirical studies has shown that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in
consumption, 1/σ, is relatively small and in most estimates considerably lower than unity. This
suggests that we have σ > 1. In this case an increase in the labor share λ (which decreases the
interest rate) leads to an increase in the savings rate. In sum, in the empirically more plausible case
σ > 1, both above effects of an increased labor share on growth move in the same direction. The
result is that an increase in the labor share leads to an unambiguous increase in the growth rate.
An immediate implication of these arguments is that the taxation of capital income can lead to
higher growth. If this is true, then we should observe high savings rates in periods when capital
taxes are high and vice versa. Figure 5 gives a tentative answer to this question. This figure shows
time series data on both the savings rate (the bold line) and tax rates on capital income (the thin
line) since the mid 1960s for the U.S.. Interestingly, savings rates and capital taxes show a highly
positive correlation over time. This evidence is certainly consistent with the result of the
overlapping generations model.
Figure 5: Capital Taxation and Aggregate Savings, U.S. 1965-1990
We have seen that the results of the two standard models of macroeconomics lead to fundamentally
different conclusions concerning the impact of the labor share on growth. Which conclusions
should we draw from this analysis?
In my opinion, a first conclusion is that the conventional wisdom should be viewed somewhat
more sceptical. Neither from a theoretical nor from an empirical point of view can strong
conclusions be drawn on the impact of capital taxation on growth. A second conclusion is that
more effort should be devoted to provide more reliable empirical evidence on the impact of
changes in the labor share on long-run growth rates. Finally, the above arguments make it clear that
the appropriate model framework is essential when it comes to judging the role of the functional
income distribution for the long-run growth process.
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4. Long-run Growth and the Personal Distribution of Income and Wealth
Let us now take a look at the role of the personal distribution of income and wealth in the growth
process. As mentioned in the beginning, recent theoretical and empirical literature on the
relationship between income inequality and economic growth is primarily occupied with the role of
the personal distribution. Persson and Tabellini (1994), who were the first to point to a possible
negative inequality-growth relationship, suggest the following explanation. High inequality in pre-
tax incomes leads the majority of people to vote for redistribution. The consequence is a progressive
tax system. Inequality is bad for growth, because inequality induces redistribution and the
distortions resulting from this redistribution are detrimental to incentives to undertake productive
investments.
The available empirical evidence, however, does not support the above model.8 First, in a cross-
section of countries, there is no statistically significant impact of inequality on taxes and transfers.
Secondly, there is very little evidence that redistribution has a detrimental impact on investment and
growth. Whether or not higher taxes have an impact on growth and investment depends on how the
tax revenues are spent: The transfer/GDP ratio and the fraction of public expenditures on education
frequently have a positive and statistically significant impact on growth.
There are further plausible reasons for a negative inequality-growth relationship for which empirical
evidence exists. One such explanation is that inequality, if not mitigated by public redistribution
measures, leads to political instability which has a negative impact on the economy’s growth rate.9
The more recent literature goes a step further and asks how social capital, trust and the degree of
acceptance of social norms can promote economic growth.10 It is evident that for an explanation of
the determinants of these factors, the distribution of income and wealth has an important role to
play.
However, the predominant explanation put forward in the recent literature is neither based on
politico-economic nor on sociological explanations. This approach is based on the argument that
imperfect capital markets are the source of possible inefficiencies of excessive inequality.11 For
evident reasons, the accumulation of human capital plays a central role in modern growth theory.
Education not only has direct costs but usually implies an initial period without income. An
individual who has not inherited the necessary funds and cannot raise these funds on the capital
market has no access to the education system. This will lead to an inefficient allocation of
resources, if the inherited wealth does not coincide with the innate abilities. In that case,
12
individuals with high potential returns to education cannot acquire the necessary human capital
while other individuals with lower innate abilities may be able to incur the education costs.
Figure 6: Investment in Human Capital with Perfect Capital Markets
The crucial point can be made by looking at Figure 6. On the horizontal axis, we measure the level
of human capital investment of a certain individual. The vertical axis shows the output level
resulting from this investment. Let us further assume for simplicity, that the relationship between
investment and output is the same for all individuals. Since human capital is the accumulated factor
this means that all individuals are of equal ability.
Figure 6 shows the equilibrium that will arise if capital markets are perfect. In this case there is a
unique interest rate at which individuals can borrow and lend. The optimal investment level is
where the marginal return equals the interest rate. In Figure 6 this condition is satisfied at an
investment level H* which leads to output Y* in the next period. Individuals who have large
inheritances, can lend their remaining wealth. Individuals, who have inherited too little or nothing
at all can realize investment H* by borrowing the corresponding funds at the prevailing interest
rate. The per-capita income of the next period is therefore independent of the wealth distribution
and given by Y*.
Figure 7: Imperfect Capital Markets
With imperfect capital markets, the situation is different. This can be demonstrated most easily by
looking at the extreme case – that is the complete absence of capital markets. In this case the
investment possibilities are given by the inherited wealth. The rich can invest a lot, HR in Figure 7,
whereas the poor can invest only little, HA. If the marginal returns are decreasing in the level of
investment the wealth distribution affects the equilibrium outcome. The per-capita income of next
period – the average of YR and YA in Figure 7 – is lower, the more unequal the wealth distribution
is. This result follows immediately from the concavity of the investment-output relationship.
These simple diagrams summarize what is behind most explanations of the inequality-growth
relationship that rely on imperfect capital markets: heterogeneous returns to investment.
Redistribution leads to higher incomes, because it improves the investment opportunities of
individuals with high marginal returns to investment. If such redistribution is at the expense of
13
individuals with low returns, the aggregate productivity of investment and therefore average
incomes in the whole economy increase.
In the above example, self-financing constraints lead to a situation where the returns to investment
are not equated at the margin between the poor and the rich. Aghion und Howitt (1998) show that
this result is more general and does not depend on the specific form of the imperfection on the
capital market.
From an empirical point of view, imperfect capital markets are certainly an important candidate to
explain the inequality-growth puzzle. For instance, most studies show that there is a strong
negative correlation between income inequality and the secondary school enrollment rates. This
relationship does not only hold for developing countries, but is also true for the rich economies.
Direct tests of this approach, however, are difficult to undertake due to the lack of appropriate
aggregate indicators of capital market imperfections. A high research potential lies in a more
disaggregate analysis of the causes and consequence of liquidity constraints for the acquisition of
human capital and other investment decisions.12
5. Inequality, Demand Composition and Innovations
In the above models, the distribution of income and wealth affects the returns to accumulation and
has therefore a direct impact on the supply of tomorrow’s factors of production. The demand for
produced output plays a passive role and has no impact on the incentives to undertake productive
investments. While this is a convenient simplifying assumption for many purposes it leaves other
potentially important mechanisms out of consideration. Few economists would contradict the
proposition that the expected level of demand for produced output is an important determinant of
investment and innovation decisions. Income inequality comes into play, when rich and poor
consumers buy different goods in different amounts so that the expected level of demand depends
on the income distribution.
To illustrate the demand-side mechanisms that could contribute to an explanation of the inequality-
growth relationship, I will now sketch an own model (Zweimüller, 1999).13 In this model, income
inequality plays a role because it shapes both the level and the time path of demand for an
innovator’s product. If innovations are the driving force behind economic growth, then the
14
expected level of demand for innovative products becomes an important determinant of the
aggregate dynamics of an economy.
Let us assume that consumers have a hierarchic structure of preferences so that they first
concentrate their consumption expenditures on basic goods, before they start to buy conveniences
and luxury goods. Let us consider the decision problem of a potential innovator under these
circumstances. A firm that wants to introduce a new product on the market, will initially have only
rich buyers, the poor cannot afford a new good. This leads to the presumption that a class of very
rich people that generates the necessary demand is a necessary determinant for a dynamic and
innovative economy. The idea that the consumption of luxury goods is an important engine of
growth creating new wants and maintaining the incentives to provide effort, is an argument which
has already be stressed by the classical economists.
Figure 8: Income Inequality and the Dynamics of Demand
Is inequality therefore good for growth because it induces innovations? The answer is: it can, but it
need not be. Figure 8 shows the evolution of demand for an innovator’s product over time. Initially
demand is low, only the rich are willing to pay for the new product, whereas poorer individuals
cannot afford the new good. As time goes by, demand grows as less wealthy individuals become
willing to pay for this good. Clearly, the time path of demand depends on the distribution of
income. If incomes are very evenly distributed, then demand may initially be low, but it will grow
very quickly – this is the case for the dotted line in Figure 8. With a very unequal distribution,
demand may initially be high but the market grows only slowly – this scenario is shown by the
solid line in Figure 8.
Figure 9: Income Distribution and the Composition of Demand
Figure 9 shows the distribution of consumption across all households in the economy. On the
horizontal axis, I measure an index for the priority in consumption of a certain good. Goods with a
very low value of this index are basic goods that are consumed by all households, whereas goods
with a high index are more luxurious goods. Let us assume that each household consumes only one
unit from each good. Then the level of consumption of a household is given by the number of goods
a household can afford. The area B in Figure 9 shows that fraction of consumers than cannot afford
good N, whereas the area A measures the fraction of consumers that can afford good N.
15
If we assume in addition that the prices of all goods are equal, then the distribution depicted in
Figure 9 is equal to the distribution of consumption expenditures. And if we further assume that all
households have the same savings rate, this distribution also reflects the distribution of income in
the economy.
Now let us assume that at a certain point of time N goods have been invented. The poorest
consumers cannot buy all N goods, but can afford only the first CA goods. The richest consumers
would like to buy CR goods, that is, they would like to buy more goods than are available on the
market. If the next innovator comes along with a slightly more luxurious product than good N, the
area A measures the fraction of consumers who want to buy this good from the period when it is
introduced.
Of course, area A is also a measure of demand that cannot be realized, since the goods more
luxurious than N have not yet been invented. We could imagine that the purchasing power reflected
in area A is directed towards luxuries that need not be invented (like gold and diamonds) or that the
rich can reduce their labor supply.
How does demand and therefore income inequality affect the incentive to innovate. To get the
intuition right, we have to be aware that Figure 9 shows the distribution of income (and
consumption) at a given point of time. Over time, new innovations take place, these innovations
induce technical progress, and the income of all consumers in the economy will rise. This means,
that over time the distribution in Figure 9 shifts to the right.
Now consider the decision of an innovator. With a given cost to introduce a new product, with
given profits per unit of sold output and with a given interest rate, the value of an innovation is
determined by the time path of demand. Clearly, under our assumptions the time path of demand is
directly determined by the income distribution. To see this more clearly, consider the situation of
the most recent innovator, the firm that produces good N. The position of this particular good in the
preference hierarchy remains unchanged over time, but the distribution shifts to the right since
incomes and consumption expenditures are growing. This means that – for this particular good - the
area A becomes larger over time, meaning that the fraction of consumers that can afford good N
grows over time an sooner or later, even the poorest households will be able to afford good N.
Clearly, the shape of the income distribution affects the time path of an innovator’s demand.
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The interesting question is, what happens when there is a redistribution of income? The answer to
this question depends on how the various consumers are affected and how such a redistribution
affects the actual and the future demand of an innovator. If there is redistribution among the fraction
of consumers that can afford all N goods, that is within the area A, there is no impact on the
innovator’s demand. Such a redistribution affects only households that can afford a new good
anyway. The level and the time path of demand of the innovator remain unchanged. And therefore
such a redistribution has no impact on innovations and growth.
However, if income is redistributed from very rich to very poor consumers, it has an impact on the
innovator’s demand. Consider a mean-preserving redistribution that leaves the size of areas A and B
unchanged but reduces the upper and increases the lower limit of the distribution, that is a
redistribution from the very rich to the very poor. Such a redistribution is favorable from the point
of view of an innovator. The reason is that the reduction in the incomes of the very rich has no
impact on the innovator’s demand: these consumers will still buy good N after the redistribution.
However, the poorer consumers will become relatively richer and will buy the innovator’s good
sooner. In other words, such a redistribution shifts the innovator’s future demand closer towards the
present. This increases the value of an innovation.
Things are different if there is a redistribution from relatively rich to poor households within the
area B. In this case, the time path of the innovator’s demand is affected twofold. On the one hand,
demand of the relatively rich consumers is shifted towards later periods. On the other hand, the poor
consumers will become richer and will be able to afford the innovator’s earlier. The net effect of
such a redistribution is always negative for the innovator. As a consequence of discounting it is
better to have a smaller profit flow in the near future, as opposed to a larger profit flow later on. The
consequences are lower discounted profits of an innovation and therefore lower growth.
The relationship between the composition of demand and the distribution of income on the one
hand and its impact on growth and innovation on the other hand, are a rather neglected channel in
the recent inequality-growth literature.14 It is an undisputed fact, however, that the income
distribution affects the structure of demand. This is documented by one of the few robust empirical
facts in economics: Engel’s law which states that the expenditure share devoted to food is
decreasing in the level of income.15 Very poor households have to concentrate most of their
expenditure to basic goods and are no customers of innovative products.
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6. Summary
This paper started with a brief review of the empirical facts on trends in income distribution in the
last century as well as in the more recent past. The data show significant changes in distributional
trends in the more recent past for various countries, but no universal trend towards more inequality.
In a next step I discussed the recent evidence concerning the empirical relationship between
inequality and long-run growth. Interestingly, this evidence does not support the proposition that
inequality is a necessary condition for a prosperous long-run development. If a relationship between
inequality and growth exists at all, the empirical evidence shows that there is a negative relation
between these two variables.
Economic research on the inequality-growth puzzle has concentrated on the role of the personal
distribution. With few exceptions the functional distribution has received far less attention. This is
not justified both from an empirical as well as from a theoretical point of view.
Explanations of a possible negative relationship between inequality and growth concentrate on
politico-economic and sociological approaches, but in particular on the consequences of capital
market imperfections. There is no doubt that liquidity constraints are an important channel by which
negative effects of inequality are transmitted, both in developing countries as well as in
industrialized countries.
Finally, I presented an approach which in my view is important but has so far been rather neglected
in the literature: the role of expected demand for the incentives to innovate in an economy.
If one shares the opinion that distributional conflicts in modern economies will be not alleviated in
the near future, one can expect that the question of how income and wealth inequality affects
macroeconomic outcomes will be a subject of increasing importance. The explanatory power of the
various approaches is, of course, an empirical question, and so far the literature is far from
providing concluding answers. However, the most important prerequisite before conclusions for
economic policy can be drawn is to clarify the crucial mechanisms by which inequality affects
growth. Ultimately, it is not only important to know whether less inequality can increase growth,
but also which policies should be adopted to eventually increase both equality and growth.
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Figure 1:   The Kuznets Curve
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Figure 2:  Recent Trends in Income Inequality
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Figure 3: Changes in the Functional Distribution of Income
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Figure 4: Inequality and Growth
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Figure 5: Capital Texation
and Aggregate Savings, U.S. 1965 - 1990
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Figure 6: Investment in Human Capital
With Perfect Capital Markets
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Figure 7: Imperfect Capital Markets
29
                                                                                                                                                                 
Figure 8: Income Inequaltity and the Dynamics of Demand
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Figure 9: Income Distribution and
The Composition of Demand
